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The author argues that the effectiveness of poverty alleviation
instruments largely depends on how poverty is defined. The
aim of reducing absolute poverty chiefly entails a discussion
of growth, historically the main factor in this process. If
poverty is defined in relative terms, on the other hand, then
it is changes in inequality that are the main factor behind
variations in its incidence. In any event, the relationship
between the two potential sources of poverty reduction is
crucial.
This article summarizes the growth and distribution
implications of growth-oriented policies in the first instance,
then of distributional policies. It concludes by considering
which instruments offer the best hope of reducing absolute
poverty or relative poverty, and how sensitive the optimum
policy combination might be to the way poverty is defined.
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I
Introduction
By the most common yardsticks of economic progress
(per capita income or purchasing power, satisfaction
of basic needs), there has been a striking decline in the
incidence of poverty in the Third World, and hence in
the world as a whole, over the past half century for
which fairly adequate data are available. With a constant
poverty line of 200 1970 United States dollars,1 world
poverty incidence fell from nearly half in 1950 to about
a quarter in 1977 and has carried on falling since,
probably to between 10% and 13% in 1995, with the
absolute number of poor declining by over 40%.2 A
considerable share of this advance has reflected rapid
growth and a low level of inequality in China. When
that country is excluded, incidence falls more slowly,
from 36% in 1950 to 24% in 1977 and somewhere
between 11% and 15% by 1995, while the absolute
number of people in poverty falls modestly by perhaps
5% to 15% over the whole period, with all or nearly all
of this reduction occurring since 1980. Defined by the
higher poverty line of 1,000 1987 international dollars,
the absolute level of poverty outside China showed a
net increase during the period 1950-1995, with this
pattern emerging over the recent period 1980-1995 as
well as before.
The decline in poverty incidence (defined by
income level) in the non-socialist world has been fitful,
uneven regionally, and threatened by changes of policy
and context. Accordingly, there is a good deal of
concern to find a secure recipe for the sort of “growth
with equity” that would bring rapid and widespread
poverty alleviation. Though there is considerable
agreement, at least among economists, with respect to
some of the elements of a good strategy to reduce it,
other possible elements are more controversial, and
there is nothing approaching consensus on the relative
importance of the suggested components. This paper
puts forward some views on what works, and
emphasizes the need to base policy on a more serious
analysis of human welfare than has been the case and
to tighten the links between the definition of poverty
and the policy response.
Any discussion of the alleviation of absolute
poverty (when defined as purchasing power below some
given absolute level) is necessarily also a discussion of
growth. One may think of the rate of poverty alleviation
as being determined jointly by the rate of average
income growth and changes in the distribution of
income. If distribution improves, this contributes to
poverty alleviation, so growth “accounts for” less than
the whole of the improvement; otherwise it “accounts
for” all or more than all of the alleviation which occurs.
In this mechanistic sense, the great bulk of the poverty
alleviation which has occurred over the past half
century, perhaps all of it, is due to growth. Over the
last decade or so, increases in inequality have become
the norm in developing (as well as developed) countries;
growth itself is, accordingly, a less secure route to
absolute poverty alleviation than before, even though
it has become the sole source thereof.
It is useful to distinguish between the primary
distribution of income –that which emerges from the
functioning of the economy before any subsequent
redistribution through taxes and transfers– and the
secondary distribution which includes the effects of
these. Taking this distinction into account, one may
think of the challenge of poverty alleviation as involving
i) growth, ii) the impacts of the particular growth pattern
followed on primary distribution (sometimes positive
and sometimes negative), and iii) direct poverty
redressal, whereby some form of redistribution takes
place to alleviate part of the poverty implicit in the
primary distribution of income; this may be through
the State or through private channels, such as the
extended family or the community.
If relative income or consumption is a key element
of the basic definition of poverty –and authors like
Easterlin (1974), Scitovsky (1976) and Hirsch (1976)
have argued that relative consumption is the central
determinant of well-being in industrial countries– then
changes in distribution are likely to be the main source
of changes in poverty incidence, where poverty is
defined as a low level of self-defined well-being (see
I thank Gerry Helleiner and José Antonio Ocampo for their
valuable comments on an earlier draft. Any remaining errors are
my own.
1 And with other country values converted to United States dollars
at the purchasing power parity conversion rate.
2 Based on Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1983) and Berry
and Serieux (2002).
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below). In either case, it is evident that the relationship
between the two potential sources of poverty reduction,
namely growth and improved equity, is important. Many
early post-war development theorists emphasized that
growth might well worsen income distribution over a
period (Kuznets, 1955). Others, including some who
did not expect the early-stage worsening of distribution
and some who believed that it would not be sharp
enough to prevent benefits reaching the poorer groups,
believed in the “trickle-down” theory, which predicts
that even if growth is not designed particularly for the
benefit of the poor, some of its fruits will nonetheless
accrue to them. The record of the last half century has
basically confirmed the trickle-down theory, at least in
the sense that much poverty alleviation has been
achieved, even in countries which did not seem to
concern themselves much with poverty alleviation. The
experience of Taiwan shows just how complementary
a very equitable distribution of income can be with very
fast growth, even during the early phases (Ranis, 1978).
Other countries, while making the point in a less
spectacular way, have records which are consistent with
it. The growth/distribution discussion has thus gradually
moved to a fairly general acceptance that the two
objectives are not likely to be in conflict in any
systematic way unless a bad combination of policies
has been chosen. The range of experiences on both the
growth and the distribution fronts suggests that policy
may matter a great deal, i.e., that not all of the variance
of outcomes is due to differing exogenous
circumstances.3
Since, especially over the longer run, growth is the
main factor in alleviating absolute poverty as measured
in income terms, it follows that those policies adopted
principally for their expected growth benefits may also
be the main determinants of how poverty changes over
time, with policies adopted for their expected
distributional benefits playing a lesser role. In practice,
some of these latter policies may in fact worsen
distribution, either because governments mainly
controlled by the relatively well-off shy away from
implementing policies in a way which will be
progressive, and/or because there remains a good deal
of guesswork as to the distributional impacts of many
policies.
Section II of the paper reviews the implications
for both growth and distribution of those policies
usually pursued with the former objective in mind,
section III does the same for those policies normally
pursued with distributional objectives in mind, section
IV points to how sensitive the composition of the
optimal policy package may be to the way poverty is
defined, and section V presents some general
conclusions on “best policies”.
II
Growth and distributional implications of primarily
 “growth-oriented” policies
There is no serious debate about the importance of
physical capital formation, human capital accumulation
and technological change as sources of growth. The
only discussion revolves around their relative
importance and how this varies by setting, and around
how best each of them may be achieved. In the latter
context such policies as fiscal and trade policy are
naturally involved. The distributional implications of
these three processes are more complicated and may
depend very much on the details of the case.
1. Conservative macroeconomic policy
It is accepted that runaway inflation is prejudicial to
growth. Whether or under what range of circumstances
low inflation (say single-digit) produces better growth
results than low double-digit levels is much less clear.
The current (strong) preference for quite low rates of
inflation seems to be based primarily on conservative
ideology (whose predictions may of course turn out to
be right) and on the perception that high inflation is
more problematic in the context of the high level of
integration towards which the world is evolving. It does
appear that hyperinflation has a negative impact on
distribution, although this may be relatively short-lived
and is in any case not a major determinant of inequality.
3 The history of ideas about poverty and its relationship to growth,
as well as many issues relating to poverty policy, are reviewed in
Lipton and Ravallion (1995).
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It is also often argued that the “inflation tax” resulting
from even intermediate levels of inflation is
significantly regressive, in which case lax monetary
policy is likely to be regressive as well. But the evidence
is fragile and there is little theoretical reason to expect
the effects to go one way or the other, unless there is a
correlation between the looseness of monetary and
fiscal policy and the distribution of net benefits from
them (taxes, government expenditures, access to credit).
It is fairly widely believed that the low real interest rates
which have tended to accompany high rates of inflation
tend to produce a more concentrated distribution of
credit than would rates closer to market levels (Fry,
1988, p. 163), but here too the evidence is still very
sparse. Hypotheses on the distributional implications
of loose as opposed to tight fiscal policy are more
varied, with nothing approaching consensus
(Whitehead, 1996). Overall, while there is no well-
grounded reason to believe that these policies have
important direct effects on equity, the credit, tax and
public expenditure patterns which go with them may
matter a good deal, albeit in ways not yet well
understood.
The complexities of the impact of macroeconomic
policy on distribution and poverty are further underlined
by the recent theories of hysteresis of social conditions
over the course of the business cycle; these argue, for
example, that poverty, human capital and employment
are not affected symmetrically by the downturn and
subsequent recovery which together constitute a
business cycle, since the gains in the recovery tend to
be less than the losses in the downturn. Thus, a business
cycle is not a neutral event in the sense that when gross
domestic product (GDP) has returned to its pre-recession
level the same will be generally true of other variables;
cyclical behaviour can have permanent costs in terms
of holding those variables below the levels they could
have reached had the evolution of GDP been less volatile.
Related to these propositions is the idea that when price
stability (desirable in itself) is obtained at the expense
of output growth stability, the net redistributive effects
may be adverse (Ocampo, 2002).
The major direct contribution that having a job
makes to people’s levels of satisfaction, as revealed
in the surveys cited above, implies that any policy
package which leads to high unemployment (e.g.,
tight monetary/fiscal policy aimed at achieving
payments balance) is doubly problematic. Only if
high current unemployment is necessary to assure
low future unemployment is such a policy likely to
be justified.
2. Saving and investment policies
For really fast growth, savings need not only to be high,
but to be used effectively as well. Both the cross-country
correlation between saving/investment rates and growth,
and the fact that the fast-growing countries of East Asia
all underwent dramatic increases in their saving rates
as part of the growth acceleration (World Bank, 1993),
underline the priority status of this variable.
Unfortunately, there remains great ambiguity as to what
factors help to raise saving in which sorts of countries.
Low demographic burdens appear to have helped in
East Asia (Bloom and Williamson, 1998); positive real
interest rates and strong financial systems appear to
raise financial saving (Mason, 1988), although whether
they matter to total saving remains unclear (Masson,
Bayoumi and Samiai, 1998, p. 497; Akyüz,1995). Fast
growth appears to contribute to high saving rates, so
the major challenge may be to achieve that first burst
of rapid growth.
If saving potential were in fact limited to the rich
(say the capitalist class), then there would be a clear
trade-off between fast growth and equitable distribution
of income. This is not universally the case, as we know
from the experience of countries like Taiwan, but it may
be that the trade-off is absent only under somewhat
limited conditions. It is no doubt better to achieve high
saving from a narrow segment of the population than
not to get it at all, especially when the objective is
alleviation of poverty defined in absolute terms. Where
saving is highly concentrated among entrepreneurs,
some of whom are not particularly rich, the situation is
more acceptable, since the distribution of consumption
expenditures is considerably less unequal than that of
income.
3. Human capital accumulation
Although it is widely accepted that human capital
accumulation is important to growth (Schultz, 1961)
and the mechanisms linking the two have been studied
from various perspectives, our understanding of the role
of human capital in the growth process is only modestly
greater than it was several decades ago. Mincerian
regressions, long the most widely used method of
demonstrating the social payoff to education and
training, have been shown to be very sensitive to
specification problems, especially omitted variables
bias and aggregation bias (Rosenzweig, 1999; Schultz,
1989); credentialism, although its possible quantitative
importance has been harder to demonstrate, also
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continues to cast doubts on the simpler Mincerian
interpretation of earnings differentials and to suggest
that they suffer from upward bias (Dore, 1976). On the
other hand, positive externalities related to the process
of imitable innovation, skill acquisition from the more
educated and the like could be significant also, and
would tend to produce a downward bias in the standard
estimates. It is reasonable to think that the Mincerian
regression estimates do give a very rough feel for social
payoffs to education in many circumstances; an
estimated 15% rate of return should probably be
interpreted as meaning that the true rate is in the range
5-20%.4 A convergence between the Mincerian
regression results and evidence from other
methodologies would be needed to narrow the range
of uncertainty.5 With practical training of various sorts
(including periodic over-career upgrading of skills)
much under discussion now, and relevant in various
ways to poverty alleviation, it is discouraging that
earnings function analysis has even more obvious
difficulties in sorting out the benefits of these forms of
human capital than those of formal education.
The Mincerian estimates have been a source of
optimism not only for their generally medium to high
estimates of the overall social returns to further human
capital accumulation, but also for their indication that
such returns are particularly high for primary education.
This underpins the belief that raising the human capital
of those towards the bottom of the educational and
earnings profiles is a useful anti-poverty tool, perhaps
even the most important tool of all. But there is still
only a limited understanding of what steps will in fact
narrow educational gaps (this requires, for example,
an understanding of the response pattern from those
on the upper side of the educational gaps) and of how
the future of education-related earnings gaps may
unfold. The empirical evidence linking human capital
advances to better growth and distribution outcomes is
too flimsy to provide a substitute for detailed
understanding of what goes on inside this “black box”.
It is quite possible, especially given the apparent
importance of the skills that are complementary to
computer literacy and the information revolution, and
of the widely observed increases in earnings gaps by
level of education over the last decade or so (Robbins,
1995), that the relative payoff to higher as opposed to
lower levels of education has risen for the medium term.
Keeping well trained people in the country is
increasingly difficult to the extent that high-level
migration gets easier in a context of globalization; the
migration option may be one of the factors behind rising
earnings gaps in developing countries (Hamada and
Bhagwati, 1975). These considerations could mean that
the optimal growth promotion strategy in the area of
human capital is no longer as likely to improve
distribution or alleviate poverty as it may have been at
some point in the past.
The argument for generalized, good quality basic
education remains powerful, since the payoffs to literacy
and numeracy are evident and since this level is
necessary to allow people to advance to the higher ones.
The need to worry more about the quality of basic
education is made more pressing, however, by the
current ambiguities in the evidence of payoff to
education in general. Further, and as with most of the
other instruments under discussion, the relationship
between human capital and poverty is likely to be
sensitive to how poverty is defined. This is
tautologically the case if one uses a “basic needs”
definition in which education figures importantly.
4. Technological change
There is no dispute about the importance of saving and
investment as a source of growth. In contrast, there is a
debate on which new technologies contribute to growth,
with theory suggesting that overly modern or capital-
intensive ones may not do so, whereas “intermediate”
or appropriate technologies are a surer bet. Empirical
confirmation of this presumption is limited and for the
most part indirect, however, and there is considerable
doubt as to whether the shelf of appropriate
technologies available is very well stocked.
The distributional impacts of technological
advance are also ambiguous. Simple theory suggests
strongly that modern technology, in creating few jobs
per unit of investment, will tend to worsen the
distribution between capital and labour income, and that
where such technology is also skill-intensive it will
likewise worsen the distribution between more skilled
and less skilled workers. Partly because we do not have
indicators of the rate or pattern of technological change
(in contrast to human capital formation, saving, etc.,
for which we do have useful measures), it has been
difficult to get an empirical feel for the validity of these
4 Estimates like that of Behrman and Deolalikar (1993) suggest
that the true effects of education on productivity might be as low
as 40% of those implicit in the simple Mincerian regressions.
5 Pritchett (1996) puts the confusion in this area quite starkly. There
has been too much simplistic analysis and too little concern about
the manifold methodological problems.
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theoretical presumptions. Technological change can be
a threat to equitable distribution and hence to poverty
alleviation, either because it has a bias towards capital
or skilled labour, or because businesses that are in a
position to adopt it are already better off (for example,
because they are larger) than those not so favourably
placed. Certain changes in agriculture can produce a
negative distributional impact through both factors, as
where tractorization not only lowers costs on large
farms in ways which smaller farms cannot replicate,
but also displaces labour and pushes more workers on
to the smaller farms.6 In other sectors, too, the size and
existing technologies of the firms which introduce new
technologies are both relevant to the final impact of
that adoption (James, 1998; Berry, 1998a).
Some aspects of the process of technological
change are more exogenous to individual developing
countries, and even to the group as a whole, than is the
case with the other sources of growth discussed above.
It is widely noted that about 97% of research and
development expenditures occur in the industrialized
countries of the North (World Bank, 1999).
Accordingly, it may be very hard for developing
countries, particularly those that are tightly tied into
the world economic system, to buffer themselves
against some of the negative effects arising from the
pattern of ongoing technological change at the world
level. Still, a good deal of the evolution of technological
practices is affected by the internal context and policies.
Though key breakthroughs in agricultural research
usually come from outside the country, it is important
for their effective adoption, and especially their
adoption by smaller farmers, that such international
research be complemented by local efforts (Evenson,
1975). In other sectors there are a number of policies
that clearly contribute to the rate of technological
improvement by smaller firms (Levy, Berry and Nugent,
1999), whose measures are usually more favourable to
employment than those adopted by larger counterparts.
5. Outward orientation and other
pro-market policies
The proponents of freer trade, less government
intervention and more market-friendly economic
policies generally have argued that this sort of shift will
raise the rate of growth not only through Heckscher-
Ohlin efficiency effects (Feder, 1983) but also by
contributing positively to domestic saving, foreign
saving (capital inflows) and the rate of technological
change as a result of greater contact with foreign
sources, etc. (Rodrik, 1995, pp. 2933-2934). There is
no doubt that each of these factors is frequently at work.
On the other side of the ledger are the negative effects
of instability in the capital inflows and outflows which
have come with freer international capital movements,
and a possibly negative effect on investment when freer
markets lower the certainty about the payoff to certain
investments. Also, to the extent that some degree of
protection is justified by the presence of learning-by-
doing effects as formalized in the “infant industry
argument”, the inability to protect may hinder countries
from helping along nascent industries which could
become competitive. Under what circumstances the
positive effects of outward orientation will prevail
remains to be seen. Given that, with only a few
exceptions, the shift to market-friendly policies has not
yet brought the developing countries an immediate or
large positive impact on growth, the case cannot be
considered closed. It may be that those effects will
ultimately be significantly positive as anticipated by
the proponents, but that a longish gestation period is
required for the benefits to manifest themselves fully,
or it may be that the optimism was simply ill-founded.
The level of analysis which provided the basis for the
policy shift was far from exemplary.7 Nor does
economic theory help much to clarify what trade
policies are likely to work best in developing countries;
too much depends on the assumptions fed into the
theory. When investor risk-aversion is strong and
learning by doing is important, it is likely that infant
industry protection will be necessary to induce some
investments which contribute to growth. If developing
countries were highly effective in the design and
implementation of policy intervention, free trade would
6 The World Bank’s somewhat belated recognition of this threat
came in the early 1970s. A study of the results of (large)
tractorization in Pakistan helped to produce it.
7 For example, although much use was made of cross-country
regressions showing a positive correlation between outward
orientation and growth, relatively little attention was paid to the
fact that the presence of a positive impact on individual countries
does not necessarily or generally imply a positive impact for the
Third World as a whole —a classic example of the fallacy of
composition. This issue is discussed in the context of primary
exports by Maizels (1994), among others, and in that of
manufactures by Faini, Clavijo and Senhadji-Semlali (1992) and
by UNCTAD (1996). An even graver flaw, because less obvious to
the untrained eye, has been the carelessness evinced in the
measurement of “outward orientation”. Alternative measures, each
with some apparent logic, are not well correlated with one another.
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probably not be their first-best option; their frequent
failure to apply infant industry protection in a way close
to that contemplated in the theory makes substantially
free trade look like a more attractive “second-best”.
There is a strong possibility that outward-oriented
policies are the best way to go for small countries but
less so for large ones. When Peru adopted import
substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies from the
1950s onward, the results appear to have been much
less favourable than those in Brazil, which between
1945 and 1980, under strong ISI policies, outgrew
almost every other country in the world (Maddison,
1992). Growth achieved by inducing multinational
corporations to invest in labour-intensive exports is
much more relevant to the smaller countries than to the
half-dozen or so in which the bulk of the less developed
countries’ population lives.
The distributional implications of freer markets,
including freer trade and international capital
movements, are hotly debated. Positive Heckscher-
Ohlin effects are expected by most proponents on the
basis of the ideas that, firstly, developing countries
typically have a comparative advantage in labour-
intensive goods and services so that freer trade should
increase the relative demand for labour and hence
improve the distribution of income and, secondly, that
freer trade in many countries implies a stronger demand
for agricultural products whose exports are indirectly
discouraged by ISI policies mainly designed to protect
manufacturing. Prominent among the various counter-
arguments is the empirical fact that the recent wave of
globalization and liberalization of trade and capital
movements has coincided with increasing inequality
in many developing countries (Berry and Stewart, 1997)
as well as in the developed ones; this fact throws doubt
on whether Heckscher-Ohlin effects are working as
strongly as predicted.8 For some regions (like Latin
America) the explanation for their not doing so may be
that these countries’ comparative advantage at a world
level does not in fact lie in unskilled labour-intensive
goods and services, but rather in goods intensive in
natural resources or relatively skilled labour, or both.
More generally, the fact that firms which engage heavily
in international trade tend to be larger (industry held
constant) than those which do not, and also tend to use
more capital-intensive and modern technologies,
suggests that distribution will tend to worsen as the
share of output which is traded internationally rises.
Putting together the still doubtful growth effects
of freer trade with the negative distributional trends
which have frequently coincided with the policy shift
makes it evident that any presumption that freer markets
will bring significant poverty alleviation should be put
on hold. Perhaps the most likely outcome is a small
positive impact on growth together with a negative
impact on distribution of medium scope, leaving a small
net effect, possibly positive and possibly negative, on
the rate of absolute poverty alleviation. But the range
of possible effects is wide, given our lack of
understanding of the mechanisms involved and the
rather confusing empirical record thus far. In a society
which places substantial weight on relative income, the
impact of this policy shift on poverty could be strongly
negative if the distributional effect is significantly
negative.
8 Various empirical studies have reached more positive judgements.
Thus, Londoño and Székely (1998) concluded on the basis of cross-
country regressions for Latin America that trade reform had
produced a positive impact on distribution, while labour reform
had had the opposite effect. Stallings and Peres (2000) found that
both trade reform and tax reform had negative impacts on household
distribution. Morley (2000) also found the impact of trade reforms
to be negative. Though they estimated a positive effect from the
reforms, Londoño and Székely concluded that the reforms alone
would not bring marked improvements in inequality or poverty
unless they had the effect of diminishing educational inequality
and widening access to other productive assets.
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III
Distribution and growth implications of primarily
“distribution-oriented” policies
As with the main components of the more growth-
oriented policies, each of the distribution-oriented
policies considered below may have significant growth
impacts besides the effects on distribution for which
they are more often implemented.
1. Asset redistribution policies
The most obvious way to improve income distribution
is through a redistribution of productive assets. In the
case of human capital, this can only be done gradually
over the course of time since expropriation and
immediate redistribution is not feasible. With physical
assets such redistribution is possible, but seriously
feasible only with land, i.e., via land reforms. That these
can have a substantial and lasting effect on income
distribution under favourable circumstances is clear.
Taiwan province of China is the most commonly cited
case; it appears that inequality fell markedly at the time
of the reform, undertaken when the country was still
mainly agricultural (Kuo, 1983, pp. 94-97). The
subsequent trajectory has been an exceptionally positive
one in terms both of growth and of distribution. It
appears that the initial equality contributed to its own
perpetuation by helping to produce a very equal
distribution of educational opportunities, dynamic
growth of small enterprise, first in rural and then in
urban areas, and a stronger political voice for the
representatives of small enterprise. But few countries
have had significant agrarian reforms, so the number
of experiences is too small to permit a judgement on
the range of circumstances under which the effects
would be as positive as they appear to have been in
Taiwan or Korea. It is also clear that only very unusual
political conditions open the door for a major land
reform to take place. It therefore appears destined not
to be an important component of many poverty
alleviation strategies, even though it may in principle
be the most promising of all in many of the less
developed countries.
Some attention has recently been given to the
potential of market-based land reforms, in which
subsidies to help small farmers buy land replace
expropriation as the means of land transfer. The
economic logic of these reforms is promising
(Deininger, 1999), although it seems unlikely that such
approaches will in practice have more than a marginal
impact on the agrarian structure if applied without
traditional confiscatory land reform. When
complemented by such traditional reform, they may
have greater value, partly through the “threat effect”
which can make landlords more flexible in the face of
expropriation. Removal of legal constraints on land
subdivision is a minimal enabling device (Lipton, 1993,
p. 651). Removal of subsidies favouring large farmers
or their crops can be a valuable supportive device for
credit or land laws to help the poor, and can be nudged
along by the fiscal stringency faced by so many
countries. Lower subsidies helped discourage the rich
from subverting reforms in north-east Brazil, though
other positive steps were also taken there.
Forest dwellers in many countries have faced
expulsion from their natural-resource bases as other
actors, sometimes private lumber companies and
sometimes the State, put pressure on them. In this sector,
as in agriculture, good distribution and efficient
production often go together, as demonstrated by the
success of community-managed forests (which produce
a range of timber and non-timber products) in a number
of the states of India (Kant, 1996) and elsewhere
(Brightman, 1987). In 1988 the Government of India
finally gave up on its former policy of excluding such
dwellers from forest management, in recognition of the
failure of that policy on both output and distribution
grounds (Kant and Berry, 1999).
2. Policy in support of small farms and micro,
small and medium-sized enterprise
Much more feasible politically than asset redistribution
policies (mainly land reform) are forms of support for
the small firms, in agriculture and outside, which are
the base of employment for the majority of the labour
force in most developing countries. Such support, to
the degree that it raises output and productivity in these
firms, directly increases the incomes of many poorer
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people. Its other advantage comes from the fact that
smaller firms, whatever the industry, tend to be more
labour-intensive than larger ones, so their presence
raises the total demand for labour relative to what it
would have been if their place had been taken by larger
firms. Although small enterprises often generate low
incomes, their productivity level (output per unit of
scarce inputs) is often high, albeit varied. Medium-sized
firms frequently achieve the highest total factor
productivity of all the size categories, and thereby
contribute to high incomes and to growth (Ho, 1980).
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) contribute
to a more equitable distribution since their factor
proportions tend to be close to those of the economy as
a whole.
Raising the productivity of small farms and of
microenterprise has an immediate effect on poverty. In
the former case the sources of success are clear —the
sort of improvements in crop varieties which defined
the green revolution. In the case of non-agricultural
microenterprise, much effort has gone into improving
credit access on the assumption that this will lead to
higher productivity and hence incomes. A major
challenge here is to assure the sustainability of the credit
institutions; most experiments thus far have failed to
pass this test (Santor, 1999). On the equally important
question of whether their social benefit-cost ratio is
adequate, the evidence is harder to come by and thus
far uncertain.9 If the available support programmes turn
out not to have strong potential to raise the collective
productivity of microenterprise, then a dilemma will
arise as to whether such support is a more or less
effective way of alleviating some poverty than is
targeted poverty alleviation involving transfers of one
sort or another to the poor.
If it is not feasible to achieve considerable
productivity increases in very small enterprises, the next
most direct way to alleviate poverty is to encourage a
rapid expansion of small to medium-sized enterprise,
which will eventually tighten up the labour market and
create jobs for those currently lodged in the less
productive microenterprise sector (Berry, 1998b).
Depending on the country, this impact on poverty may
come very quickly or with some lag.
3. Direct poverty-redressal policies
All societies have ways of alleviating the poverty of
those with inadequate entitlements on the basis of their
own efforts or opportunities. In developing countries,
most such mechanisms involve the family (including
the extended family) or the community. Developing
countries have been evolving targeting techniques over
the last decade or so; the statistical record, while still
ambiguous, holds out a reasonable hope (Grosh, 1995)
that, with further experimentation and refinement, they
may play an increasing role in poverty alleviation over
the next few decades, in some countries at least.10
A number of higher-income developing countries
(several in Latin America, for example) are moving
towards such developed-country staples as
unemployment insurance. These too will inevitably go
through a period of experimentation before it becomes
clear what role they can and should play. The same goes
for the various “safety net” public employment
programmes which a number of governments have
implemented over the last few decades, from the Indian
state of Maharashtra to Chile under Pinochet. These
pay a low enough wage to ensure that only the needy
take up the employment option offered, and they attempt
to generate social benefits in the form of infrastructure
(road maintenance, school building, other).
9 While it is clear in many cases that the credit recipients have
done better than non-recipients, this leaves open the question of
whether the gains of the former have been at the expense of losses
among the latter, a not implausible scenario in cases like small-
scale retailing where the structure is one of monopolistic
competition and the total market size may be quite constrained. A
recent, impressive study of the main microfinance institutions in
Bangladesh is that of Morduch (1998).
10 Ocampo (2001, p. 25) notes that in two of the three countries of
Latin America where rural poverty reduction was most marked in
the 1990s, namely Brazil and Chile (the other was Panama), the
reduction was closely tied to an allocation of transfers and State
subsidies targeted on the poorer sectors.
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IV
Policy priorities vary with the definition of poverty
Past errors in the interpretation of how development
occurs have been at least matched by oversimplification
in the matter of defining poverty. Social scientists other
than economists (especially sociologists and
psychologists) have long emphasized that people’s
feelings of deprivation are very much related to relative
income and purchasing power and the feelings of
inferiority which arise when these are low, especially
in competitive societies where people are judged by
their relative success. The concentration of economists
on income-related measures of welfare may have been
no more than a naïve prejudice, on balance ill-supported
by other more direct evidence. Specifically, when
people in the industrial countries (where such surveys
have been carried out with some frequency) are directly
consulted about their happiness and its correlates,
absolute income seems to play a much smaller role than
standard economic theory would suggest. It is
moderately significant when the comparison is between
people at different levels of the income hierarchy at a
point of time, but less so –some authors say virtually
insignificant– as a factor in how average societal welfare
changes over time, even when average incomes have
risen considerably (Easterlin, 1974; Scitovsky, 1976;
Oswald, 1997). Most such studies reveal that the
strongest influence among economic variables comes
from employment; people with jobs are much happier
than those without them.11 Low inflation also makes
people happier. The educated are happier than the
uneducated, the self-employed than employees and the
retired than the economically active. The ultimate
meaning of all this evidence remains to be seen; in
particular, the small apparent role of income cries out
for analysis.12
One might plausibly guess that income would be a
more significant determinant of self-reported happiness
in lower-income (developing) countries, and the
available data do show this. Frank (1997, p. 1834) notes
that “most careful studies find a clear time-series
relationship between subjective well-being and absolute
income at low levels of absolute income”. Where most
people lack minimally adequate shelter and nutrition,
additional income yields significant and lasting
improvements in subjective well-being (Diener and
Diener, 1995). Reported satisfaction levels are
significantly lower in extremely poor countries than in
rich ones, and within countries the positive link between
income and satisfaction is significant primarily at the
lowest levels of relative income. “For individuals in the
middle and upper portions of the income distribution,
variations in income explain less than 2% of variation
in reported satisfaction levels” (Frank, 1997, pp. 1834-
1835, citing Diener and Diener, 1995). Having
concluded that average satisfaction levels within a
country are not significantly correlated with income
over time, Frank puts great emphasis on relative status
as a source of respect and a determinant of well-being.
The surprising (to many economists at least)
findings on the relative unimportance of income as a
determinant of societal welfare may be only one of
several reasons for reconsidering the conceptual basis
for poverty policy. The role of a sense of belonging to
a community in human welfare is obvious at one level,
but it remains to be factored into discussions of
economic policy. The same may be said of “social
capital” (the ability to work effectively with others).
Participatory poverty assessments uncover some of the
correlates of welfare and deprivation as experienced
by the respondents. In his study in the Republic of
Guinea, Shaffer (1998) found that, although
consumption data revealed no relative deprivation of
women vis-à-vis men, two other dimensions which
disproportionately affect women surfaced clearly:
excessive workloads and lack of decision-making
authority/respect.
11 This is presumably due in part to unhappy people having trouble
finding jobs, but longitudinal studies by psychologists have
demonstrated that this is not the only cause (Oswald, 1997, p. 1822).
12 Though rising average income does not appear to lead to anything
like commensurate increases in average happiness, it is true that
there is a significant cross-section relationship between happiness
and income. In the European data for 1975-86, 18.8% of the bottom
quintile report being “very happy” compared with 28.4% for the
top one, while 26.7% report being “not too happy” compared with
13.1% for the top quintile (Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald,
1996). Part of this correlation would be due to the higher
unemployment rates of the lower-income groups. Over time the
happiness of the unemployed shows much more fluctuation than
that of the employed, for reasons as yet unexplained.
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The combination of evidence to the effect that more
income does make individuals better off than their
counterparts with less income, but that when everyone’s
income rises over time there is no comparable effect on
average reported happiness, is consistent with the general
notion that people’s welfare depends on relative status,
which in modern societies is affected by relative income
and consuming power. Given such attitudes, deprivation
–the reason one is interested in poverty as a problem–
can be alleviated mainly, or even exclusively, by reducing
the degree of income inequality. But, as many authors
have emphasized, a more basic implication of such a
situation is that society is dysfunctional in the sense that,
as long as it defines satisfaction in relative terms, there
is no way to make everyone better off. The gain of people
on low incomes who are now closer in status to those
above them is a loss to the latter, who can no longer
enjoy the feelings of superiority which gave them
satisfaction before. A society whose attitudes are less
individualistic and competitive and more positively
community- or society-oriented has the chance to benefit
much more from economic advance. In short, the
empirical evidence from the industrial countries suggests
that attitudinal change may be more important than
economic growth, and that without the former the latter
may remain largely irrelevant. Although this is less true
of the developing countries, to the extent that they
replicate the attitudinal patterns of the rich countries it
will become their problem too. A key objective of any
society should be to reduce the “zero sum” component
of what gives people satisfaction.
Given current attitudes, what does the partial and in
some ways puzzling evidence on the determinants of
human welfare add up to, in terms of its practical
implications for economic policy? Most striking is the
ambiguous role of income. Taken literally, the results
would seem to suggest that economic growth ought to
be severely downgraded in our thinking about poverty
and welfare and that socio-economic policy should focus
much more than it now does on employment (for those
that want it), on employment conditions (including the
avoidance of excessive work), on income distribution,
on freedom from economic insecurity, on the importance
of personal respect, and on sense of community.
Whatever the ultimate meaning of the low weight
attached to income, a plausible case can be made that
most of the other identified correlates of self-declared
happiness are associated with one another in a mutually
supportive way. To begin with, a (or the) main direct
source of high levels of income inequality is an
inadequate demand for the labour of those with the least
skills, and this also tends to produce unemployment of
the more chronic and socially costly type, together with
economic insecurity and the anxiety which accompanies
it. Income inequality is also associated with an unequal
distribution of physical and human capital. These
interconnected inequalities are a direct cause of lack of
respect for those at the bottom of the pyramids of income,
wealth, education, skills, etc. Diminishing the inequalities
naturally reduces the number of people subjected to lack
of respect from others, even if those others retain an
income/wealth/education-related definition of status and
respect; although in fact, when these variables do not
constitute such a gulf among people, the societal
definition of the sources of respect is likely to change in
a positive way. When differences among people are
smaller, the sense of community is also more developed
and positive in its impacts.
As noted above, there has been no general positive
trend in income or expenditure distribution over the
last half century, and a disproportionate share of
countries have recently suffered the opposite pattern.
It follows that a poverty indicator which gives enough
weight to relative income will show little if any progress
over time, especially during the last couple of decades.
Thus, the widely differing implications of the alternative
poverty indicators that have been put forward suggest
an urgent need to consider more seriously which of
these are most meaningful and perhaps to identify some
professionally defensible combination of them that
would give due weight to each of the determinants of
deprivation and satisfaction as experienced by
individuals. Most of the indicators used by economists
are naïve in their implicit assumptions about the sources
of individual feelings of deprivation, but thus far little
attempt has been made to incorporate anything
subjective into the indicators compiled by international
agencies and by most economic researchers.
One of the more notable complexities still to be
effectively dealt with is that of intra-family inequalities
and the way they may have been changing over time. If
rising incomes, urbanization and other processes of
development have typically brought with them advances
in intra-family equality between the sexes, one would
conclude that, correctly measured, the distribution of
expenditure among persons has evolved more positively
than the standard estimates, which assume away intra-
family inequality. How the distribution of subjective
welfare has evolved is less clear; if women’s expectations
have evolved more rapidly than their relative position,
for example, subjective welfare distribution might move
in the opposite direction from that of expenditures.
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V
What are the best bets?13
Which policy instruments are most effective in
alleviating poverty thus depends very much on how
poverty is defined. The optimal package is easiest to
define when absolute poverty, as measured by income
or expenditure per person, is the operative concept. In
that case it is clear that growth is central, growth with
equity is desirable, and policies whose main objective
is redistribution are unlikely to play a large role. The
most promising instruments are promotion of a high
saving rate, preferably with widespread involvement
of the population; investment in human capital,
especially for those population groups who lag in that
respect; technological change, with a serious effort to
keep the innovations within the realm of “appropriate
technology”; and policy support for smaller production
units. Population policy and asset redistribution may
be among these key elements in some countries,
institutional reform and monetary/fiscal policy in
others. Whether generally market-friendly policies will
play a positive or negative role remains to be seen.
As the weight assigned to relative poverty (also
defined by income or expenditures per person) and to
employment conditions, respect, etc., increases and that
assigned to absolute poverty decreases, the relative
promise of the various policies is altered, perhaps
dramatically. When relative poverty is the dominant
concern, support for smaller productive units and
attempts to raise the human capital of the poor are
probably the best policy options available in most
countries; asset redistribution may be the best in some
cases where feasible, and significant in others;
population policy can be important, especially when
complemented by strong gender policies in countries
where inter-gender inequality is significant. Saving and
technology policies are question marks in this situation,
since there is no general presumption that they can
improve distribution even if executed fairly carefully
with that objective in mind. Market-friendly policies
are an unlikely component of the package.14 These
policies may be deleterious in another way; to the extent
that they focus on market competition as the route to
wealth for individuals, firms, regions, etc., they may
heighten people’s awareness of their relative position
and thereby make the perceived deprivation of those
performing less well in the market that much more
acute.
Since almost all students of poverty would grant
that, if income and expenditures are the relevant
indicators, both absolute and relative positions affect
welfare, we are left with the conclusion that the optimal
package will be somewhere between the two just
identified, closer to the first if absolute poverty is more
important and closer to the second if relative poverty is
more important.
The aspect of relative position which can most
easily be taken into account in the measurement of
change is relative income. But, as noted, an individual’s
welfare involves also the way he or she is treated by
others and the related sense of social inferiority, the
lack of access to psychological support, etc.
Discriminatory treatment towards women, the aged,
children or subordinated ethnic groups all figure
importantly in the loss of welfare. Accordingly,
measures of societal welfare should take these forms
of inequality into account directly. While some societies
have made progress in dealing with ethnic and gender
inequality, the problems associated with age may have
on balance become more severe as more people live to
advanced ages and as family responsibility for that
group diminishes.
The task of policy prescription is altered again and
perhaps made more complex when poverty is defined
in other, more subjective ways which allow for the
benefits of feelings of community and feelings of
security (not taken account of in the absolute or relative
income figures, although well enough reflected in the
market behaviour of individuals in the form of insurance
purchases, risk aversion in investment behaviour, etc.).
Without some concrete feel for societal preferences as
to what the good life is (and recognizing that such
perceptions are themselves to some extent dependent
13 Among many reviews of poverty reduction strategies are Shaffer’s
report to the United Nations (United Nations, 1998), Chatterjee’s
paper for the Asian Development Bank (Chatterjee, 1995) and
Lipton and Ravallion (1995).
14 This is a very broad-brush discussion. Within the category of
market-friendly reforms there are some which are quite likely to
worsen income distribution and others which are quite likely to
improve it.
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on past and current experience), it is impossible to take
strong positions on what good policy is. It is clear,
though, that it might look rather different from what
such policy would be when the indicators were
objectively measurable income or expenditure.
Desire for security is not necessarily inconsistent
with a need for adventure as well; societies need to
search for good ways to reconcile these goals. If access
to opportunities is more important to satisfaction than
ex post success in economic terms, this too alters the
way in which both overall economic performance and
the degree of inequality in a society should be measured.
Unfortunately, the concrete policy implications of these
plausible components of social welfare are at this time
fuzzy, for lack of careful assessment of what they might
imply in practical terms.
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